Abstract
Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0931-8658 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22145 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 15:34 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |