Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of resource owners being threatened with possible nationalization / expropriation. If shows that Long′s [J. Econom. Theory10, 42-53, 1975] overextraction result critically depends on availability of a relatively safer investment alternative. If all investment alternatives are similiarly uncertain, then resource extraction is efficient, but the overall savings-consumption decision is distorted toward consumption.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| ISSN: | 0095-0696 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 22147 |
| Date Deposited: | 09. Dec 2014 15:39 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
