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Abstract
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by providing a detailed picture of short-run dynamics in a game of strategic experimentation where agents are located in a social network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for links. This means that in the design of networks there exists a trade-off between the speed of learning and accuracy.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Strategic Experimentation, Networks, Learning |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A8 - Strategische Erzeugung und Weitergabe von Informationen |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | C73, D83, D85 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-22165-5 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 22165 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2014, 09:12 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |
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