
Abstract
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by providing a detailed picture of short-run dynamics in a game of strategic experimentation where agents are located in a social network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for links. This means that in the design of networks there exists a trade-off between the speed of learning and accuracy.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Strategic Experimentation, Networks, Learning |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A8 - Strategische Erzeugung und Weitergabe von Informationen |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C73, D83, D85 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-22165-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 22165 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Dec 2014, 09:12 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:02 |