Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus (2014): Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment. In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 35, No. 5: pp. 350-356 |
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2619
External fulltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2619
Abstract
This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
ISSN: | 1099-1468 |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 22176 |
Deposited On: | 16. Dec 2014 09:17 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
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