Abstract
We study a tractable two-dimensional model of price discrimination. Consumers combine a rigid with a more flexible choice, such as choosing the location of a house and its quality or size. We show that the optimal pricing scheme involves no bundling if consumer types are affiliated. Conversely, if consumer types are negatively affiliated over some portion of types then some bundling occurs.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Price discrimination, Bundling, Monopoly, Multidimensional screening |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A10 - Mehrdimensionale Anreizprobleme, Delegation und Kommunikation |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D42, D82, D86 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-22183-5 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22183 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 16. Dez. 2014, 09:16 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |