Abstract
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Keywords: | Alliances, contests, conflict, in-group favoritism |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
| ISSN: | 2314-6133 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 24313 |
| Date Deposited: | 01. Apr 2015 10:32 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017 10:54 |
