Abstract
We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection and to a punishment fee. This compliance framework induced only persons with high deceptive abilities to underreport and, so, caused self-selection. Among the students who judged these videos, we find that the deception detection rate was significantly below 50 percent and even lower if the self-selection pressure in the tax compliance experiment was higher. This suggests that, when subjects can choose whether to state the truth or to lie, there is a self-selection effect by which individuals with higher deceptive ability are more likely to lie.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Decision making; Interpersonal interaction; Judgement; Perception |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D83, H26 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 24387 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Mrz. 2015, 12:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Mrz. 2017, 10:54 |