Deception detection and the role of self-selection

Konrad, Kai A.; Lohse, Tim and Qari, Salmai (2013): Deception detection and the role of self-selection. CEPR Discussion Papers, 9384

Abstract

We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection and to a punishment fee. This compliance framework induced only persons with high deceptive abilities to underreport and, so, caused self-selection. Among the students who judged these videos, we find that the deception detection rate was significantly below 50 percent and even lower if the self-selection pressure in the tax compliance experiment was higher. This suggests that, when subjects can choose whether to state the truth or to lie, there is a self-selection effect by which individuals with higher deceptive ability are more likely to lie.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Decision making; Interpersonal interaction; Judgement; Perception
• Faculties: Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D83, H26
• Language: English