Konrad, Kai A. und Thum, Marcel
(2011):
Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy.
WZB Discussion Paper, SP II 2011-109
Abstract
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | Q54, Q58, F53, H41 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 24395 |
| Date Deposited: | 01. Apr 2015 10:20 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017 10:54 |
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