Abstract
We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments. incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | merger incentives; strategic trade policy |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D43, D44, F12, L11, L13, L41 |
| Ort: | München |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 24404 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 30. Mrz. 2015 10:47 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Mrz. 2017 10:54 |
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