
Abstract
It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | inverse campaigning; information; voting; policy design |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74, E61 |
ISSN: | 0013-0133 |
Place of Publication: | München |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24405 |
Date Deposited: | 30. Mar 2015, 10:54 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Inverse campaigning. (deposited 30. Mar 2015, 10:54) [Currently Displayed]