Abstract
This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time-consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile. Extortionary governments‘ incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish; instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility-increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time-consistent extortionary taxation, but introduces other distortions that reduce workers' utility.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | migration; education; globalization; commitment; time consistent income taxation; globalisation |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | H21, H23 |
Ort: | München |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 24411 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 30. Mrz. 2015, 12:22 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Mrz. 2017, 10:54 |