Abstract
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.
Item Type: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | investment; endogenous property rights; contests; incumbency advantage; proprietary states |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D23, D72, D74, H54, O10, P16 |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
Place of Publication: | München |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24412 |
Date Deposited: | 30. Mar 2015, 12:28 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |