Abstract
We study the profitability and welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it is not profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. We apply the results to the merger between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, where subsidies are a constant matter of debate. Our theory explains why the merger was profitable for Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, why Airbus Industries opposed the merger, why the US authorities agreed to the merger, and why the EU competition authorities opposed it.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Merger; strategic trade policy |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D43, D44, F12, L11, L13 |
ISSN: | 0347-0520 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24418 |
Date Deposited: | 30. Mar 2015, 13:18 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |