Abstract
We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | property rights; anarchy; government |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D30, D70, H10 |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259 |
| Place of Publication: | München |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 24425 |
| Date Deposited: | 31. Mar 2015, 06:56 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |
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