Abstract
In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D44 |
ISSN: | 0143-6570 |
Place of Publication: | Stockholm |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24426 |
Date Deposited: | 31. Mar 2015, 07:01 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |