Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

Konrad, Kai A. (2008): Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition. WZB Discussion Paper, SP II 2008-10

Abstract

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: Corporate income; capital income; Taxation; tax competition; minimum tax; tax coordination; Stackelberg
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: H87
• Ort: Berlin
• Sprache: Englisch