Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A. und Leininger, Wolfgang (2007): Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans. Ruhr Economic Paper, 16

Abstract

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: Free-riding; defence; collective Action; distributional conflict; war; norms
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D72, D74, H41
• Ort: Duisburg-Essen
• Sprache: Englisch