Abstract
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Free-riding; defence; collective Action; distributional conflict; war; norms |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74, H41 |
Place of Publication: | Duisburg-Essen |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24465 |
Date Deposited: | 02. Apr 2015, 07:04 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |