Abstract
In (Montague, 1970), Montague defines a formal theory of linguistic meaning which interprets a small fragment of English through the use of two basic types of objects: individuals and propositions. In this paper, I develop a comparable semantics which only uses one basic type of object (hence, single-type semantics). Such a semantics has been suggested by Partee (2009) as a ‘minimality test’ for the Montagovian type system, which challenges the need for a bi-partitioned ontology. The proposed semantics captures the propositional interpretation of proper names, unifies Montague’s semantic ontology, and yields insight into the apparatus of types in formal semantics.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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Form of publication: | Postprint |
Keywords: | foundations of formal semantics, natural language metaphysics, single-type hypothesis, type theory, unification |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24473 |
Date Deposited: | 03. Apr 2015, 06:18 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |