Abstract
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to nonwelfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Optimal income Taxation; labor unions; work hours |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | H21, H23 |
Place of Publication: | Berlin |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24482 |
Date Deposited: | 07. Apr 2015, 06:26 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |