Abstract
It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be explained, the kind of unification afforded by the Bayesian framework to cognitive science does not necessarily reveal aspects of a mechanism. Bayesian unification, nonetheless, can place fruitful constraints on causal-mechanical explanation.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| ISSN: | 1464-3537 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 24581 |
| Date Deposited: | 21. Apr 2015 07:13 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017 10:55 |
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