Abstract
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24838-4 |
ISSN: | 2073-4336 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 24838 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 18. Mai 2015, 06:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:06 |