Abstract
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24838-4 |
ISSN: | 2073-4336 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24838 |
Date Deposited: | 18. May 2015 06:49 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:06 |