Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking

Pigozzi, Gabriella; Hartmann, Stephan (2006): Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking. 1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, 6-8 December, ILLC, University of Amsterdam.

Abstract

The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The difficulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the one hand, and the merging approach on the other hand. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, the question is how good the merging approach is in tracking the truth, and how it compares with the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures.

• Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
• Form of publication: Postprint
• Published in: Endriss, Ulle and Lang, Jérôme (eds.) . (2006): Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2006). pp. 408-421
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 120 Epistemology
• Number of Pages: 13
• Language: German