Dynamics of Political Systems

Buchheim, Lukas und Ulbricht, Robert (27. November 2015): Dynamics of Political Systems. Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL) 2015-22

Abstract

We develop a model of regime dynamics that embeds the principal transition scenarios examined by the literature. Political systems are a priori unrestricted and dynamics emerge through the combination and interaction of transition events over time. The model attributes a key role to beliefs held by political outsiders about the vulnerability of regimes, governing the likelihood and outcome of transitions. In equilibrium, transition likelihoods are declining in a regime's maturity,generating episodes of political stability alternating with rapid successions of revolts, counter revolts, and reforms. The stationary distribution of regimes is bimodal. The model dynamics match the data remarkably well.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: Critical junctures, democratization, invariant distribution, iron law of oligarchy, regime dynamics, revolts
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D74, D78, P16
• Sprache: Englisch

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