
Abstract
Public goods provision often involves groups of contributors repeatedly interacting with administrators who can extract rents from the pool of contributions. We suggest a novel identification approach that exploits the sequential ordering of decisions in a panel vector autoregressive model to study social interactions in the laboratory. Despite rent extraction, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods Game. In the short run, temporary changes in behavior trigger substantial behavioral multiplier effects. We demonstrate that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings with a lack of cooperative attitudes and trust.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Cooperation; trustworthiness; rent extraction; methods for laboratory experiments; panel vector autoregressive model |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C32, C91, H41 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-27513-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 27513 |
Date Deposited: | 22. Feb 2016, 11:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:07 |