Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas

Kocher, Martin and Matzat, Dominik (January 2016): Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 172, No. 1: pp. 163-194

Abstract

The existing results from literature on preferences over sanctions in social dilemmas are inconclusive. Our experimental setup allows us to study both preferences over punishment and reward mechanisms and preferences over their levels of effectiveness. We show that the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) with reward is the most favored and the most efficient institution, although the VCM with punishment leads to higher contributions. Subjects prefer extreme values of the sanctioning technologies, and contributions increase in the level of effectiveness. There is no difference in the voting pattern between a partner- and a stranger-matching treatment.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Publisher's Version
• Faculties: Economics > Chairs; Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92
• Language: English