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Abstract
Auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common-knowledge ex-post risk. In such auctions, precautionary bidding predicts that under expected utility, DARA bidders reduce their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium. Because the degree of riskiness of an auctioned good and bidders׳ levels of risk aversion are difficult to observe in field settings, we conduct experimental auctions that allow us to identify the precautionary premium directly. We find strong evidence for precautionary bidding. The effect is robust to changes in experimental design features. Our experiment provides the first empirical demonstration of precautionary motives in a strategic setting.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | Precautionary bidding; Prudence; Auction; Experiment; |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C91, D44, D81 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 27546 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 26. Feb. 2016, 10:54 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:07 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding. (deposited 13. Aug. 2010, 12:37)
- An experimental study of precautionary bidding. (deposited 26. Feb. 2016, 10:54) [momentan angezeigt]