Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin (2014): More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 108, No. C: pp. 396-409 |
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Abstract
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | Ultimatum bargaining; Ultimatum game; Experiment; Social preferences; |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C91 |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 27550 |
Deposited On: | 26. Feb 2016 10:56 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:07 |
Available Versions of this Item
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More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature. (deposited 06. Feb 2014 15:28)
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More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. (deposited 06. Feb 2014 15:28)
- More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. (deposited 26. Feb 2016 10:56) [Currently Displayed]
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More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. (deposited 06. Feb 2014 15:28)