Abstract
Objective Bayesianism says that the strengths of one’s beliefs ought to be probabilities, calibrated to physical probabilities insofar as one has evidence of them, and otherwise sufficiently equivocal. These norms of belief are often explicated using the maximum entropy principle. In this paper we investigate the extent to which one can provide a unified justification of the objective Bayesian norms in the case in which the background language is a first-order predicate language, with a view to applying the resulting formalism to inductive logic. We show that the maximum entropy principle can be motivated largely in terms of minimising worst-case expected loss.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Publikationsform: | Postprint |
Keywords: | objective Bayesianism; g-entropy; predicate language; scoring rule; minimax |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 120 Epistemologie
100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISSN: | 1099-4300 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 28339 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 30. Jun. 2016, 08:11 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:07 |