Job Allocation in a Temporary Employment Agency via Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auctions Using a Multi-agent System

Landes, Jürgen and Buettner, Ricardo (November 2011): Job Allocation in a Temporary Employment Agency via Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auctions Using a Multi-agent System. In: Artificial Intelligence (MICAI), 2011 10th Mexican International Conference: pp. 182-187

Abstract

We consider the problem of how a temporary employment agency allocates temporary agency workers to jobs. To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space. That is agents can specify how much a work contract consisting of several components such as wage per hour, days of leave, overtime premiums and hours of work is valued. We show that the mechanism we develop satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Keywords: contracts;employment;multi-agent systems;personnel;resource allocation;Pareto efficiency;Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction;incentive compatibility;job allocation;multi-agent system;multidimensional contract space;multidimensional price VCG auction;temporary agency worker;temporary employment agency;Contracts;Cost accounting;Employment;Level set;Protocols;Resource management;Electronic Human Resource Management;Mechanism Design;Multi Agent System;Multi-dimensional Price;Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• Language: English