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Landes, Jürgen and Buettner, Ricardo (November 2011): Job Allocation in a Temporary Employment Agency via Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auctions Using a Multi-agent System. In: Artificial Intelligence (MICAI), 2011 10th Mexican International Conference: pp. 182-187

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We consider the problem of how a temporary employment agency allocates temporary agency workers to jobs. To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space. That is agents can specify how much a work contract consisting of several components such as wage per hour, days of leave, overtime premiums and hours of work is valued. We show that the mechanism we develop satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.

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