Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Casual Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation

Reutlinger, Alexander (2016): Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Casual Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. In: Philosophy of Science

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation (for short, CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which causal and non-causal are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 0031-8248
• Language: English