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Reutlinger, Alexander
(August 2016):
Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics?
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
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![[img]](https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28975/1.hassmallThumbnailVersion/Reutlinger_Does_the_Counterfactual_Theory_of_explanation_apply_to_non-causal_explanations_in_Metaphysics.pdf)  Preview |
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Abstract
In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) captures the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I support this claim by illustrating that CTE is applicable to Euler's explanation (an example of a non-causal scientific explanation) and Loewer's explanation (an example of a non-causal metaphysical explanation).
