Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics?

Reutlinger, Alexander (August 2016): Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics? In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Abstract

In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) captures the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I support this claim by illustrating that CTE is applicable to Euler's explanation (an example of a non-causal scientific explanation) and Loewer's explanation (an example of a non-causal metaphysical explanation).

• Item Type: Journal article
• Keywords: scientific explanation, non-causal explanation, metaphysical explanation, mathematical explanation, grounding
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science; Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Physics
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 1879-4912
• Language: English