Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson's argument only applies to one of two versions of the no-miracles argument. The other, more considerate version is not adequately reconstructed in Howson's approach and thus remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a Bayesian reconstruction of this version of the no-miracles argument and show that it is valid. We then proceed to discuss a number of aspects of NMA on that basis.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Keywords: | Bayesianism, no miracles argument, realism, base rate fallacy |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-28987-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 28987 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 21. Jul. 2016 06:46 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:07 |