Abstract
This chapter re-visits Johan van Benthem’s proposal to study the logic of “best actions” in games. After introducing the main ideas behind this proposal, this chapter makes three general arguments. First, we argue that the logic of best action has a natural deontic rider. Second, that this deontic perspective on the logic of best action opens the door to fruitful contributions from deontic logic to the normative foundation of solution concepts in game theory. Third, we argue that the deontic logic of solution concepts in games takes a specific form, which we call “obligation as weakest permission”. We present some salient features of that logic, and conclude with remarks about how to apply it to specific understandings of best actions in games.
Dokumententyp: | Buchbeitrag |
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Keywords: | Game theory; Deontic logic; Rationality; Non-normal modal logic; Epistemic logic |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISBN: | 978-3-319-06024-8 |
ISSN: | 2211-2758 |
Ort: | Cham |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 29335 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 24. Aug. 2016, 12:31 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:07 |