The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission

Roy, Olivier; Anglberger, Albert J. J. und Gratzl, Norbert (2012): The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission. In: Ågotnes, Thomas; Broersen, Jan und Elgesem, Dag (Hrsg.): Deontic Logic in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Bd. 7393. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. S. 139-150

Abstract

This paper studies the following interpretation of obligations: A person i ought to do A in a situation S just in case everything else i may (and can) do in S is consistent with A. In such a case A can be called the weakest permission that i has in S. We show that, under this interpretation, obligation and permission are not dual notions, and that it gives rise to an interesting interplay between deontic and alethic notions. We also discuss the logics adequacy w.r.t. the paradoxes of (classic) deontic logic and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it. We finally show that practical, rational recommendations in games provide a natural, concrete application of such an understanding of obligations and permissions.

• Dokumententyp: Buchbeitrag
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) ; Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic ; Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Ethics and Value Theory
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik ; 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 170 Ethik
• ISBN: 978-3-642-31569-5
• ISSN: 0302-9743
• Ort: Berlin, Heidelberg
• Sprache: Englisch