The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission

Roy, Olivier; Anglberger, Albert J. J. and Gratzl, Norbert (2012): The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission. In: Ågotnes, Thomas; Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag (eds.) : Deontic Logic in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7393. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 139-150

Abstract

This paper studies the following interpretation of obligations: A person i ought to do A in a situation S just in case everything else i may (and can) do in S is consistent with A. In such a case A can be called the weakest permission that i has in S. We show that, under this interpretation, obligation and permission are not dual notions, and that it gives rise to an interesting interplay between deontic and alethic notions. We also discuss the logics adequacy w.r.t. the paradoxes of (classic) deontic logic and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it. We finally show that practical, rational recommendations in games provide a natural, concrete application of such an understanding of obligations and permissions.

• Item Type: Book Section
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic; Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Ethics and Value Theory
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic; 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 170 Ethics
• ISBN: 978-3-642-31569-5
• ISSN: 0302-9743
• Place of Publication: Berlin, Heidelberg
• Language: English