Abstract
The paper addresses charges of risk and loss aversion as well as of irrationality directed against the precautionary principle (PP), by providing an epistemic analysis of its specific role in the safety law system. In particular, I contend that: 1) risk aversion is not a form of irrational or biased behaviour; 2) both risk and loss aversion regard the form of the utility function, whereas PP rather regards the information on which to base the decision; 3) thus PP has formally nothing to do with risk or loss aversion but rather with risk awareness; 4) PP removes a fictional construct in the legal system, according to which any hazard should be ignored and denied until it is scientifically proven; 5) the quandary originates in the tension between current methods of evidence evaluation, and the logic underlying PP which demands for a probabilistic epistemology.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Postprint |
Keywords: | precautionary principle; risk; safety; health; law |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Ethics and Value Theory |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 170 Ethics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-29379-1 |
ISSN: | 1989-7022 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 29379 |
Date Deposited: | 28. Aug 2016, 16:51 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:07 |