Entitlements and Obligations

Schlicht, Ekkehart (1995): Entitlements and Obligations. Discussion Papers in Economics 1995-20

Abstract

This is an electronic reprint of the second chapter of the book "On Custom in the Economy" by Ekkehart Schlicht that has been published in 1998 by the Clarendon Press, Oxford. The chapter focusses on the behavioral entailments of concluding a contract.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Form of publication: Publisher's Version
• Keywords: Keywords: entitlements, obligations, contracting, norms, behavioral economics, self-enforcing contracts non-enforcable contracts, norms, moralistic aggression
• Faculties: Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Institutional Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Law and Economics; Economics > Chairs > Chair of Institutional Economics (closed)
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: A12, D01, D03, D86, K11, K12, L14, P14, P48
• ISBN: 0-19-829224-4
• Language: English

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