Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks

Colombo, Matteo; Elkin, Lee und Hartmann, Stephan (15. December 2016): Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.

Abstract

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Submitted Version
• Keywords: Bayesian cognitive science, representing uncertainty, scientific realism, underdetermination thesis
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science; Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• Language: English