Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson's argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other, more considerate version remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Keywords: | Bayesianism, no miracles argument, realism, base rate fallacy |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-41937-4 |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 41937 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Jan. 2018 12:22 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:17 |