
Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson's argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other, more considerate version remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Keywords: | Bayesianism, no miracles argument, realism, base rate fallacy |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-41937-4 |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 41937 |
Date Deposited: | 09. Jan 2018 12:22 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:17 |