
Abstract
Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple and compelling consensus positions are not always available.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Keywords: | AGM; belief revision; consensus; disagreement; unanimity |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 120 Epistemology |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-42371-0 |
ISSN: | 2161-2234 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 42371 |
Date Deposited: | 20. Feb 2018 06:52 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:17 |