Abstract
Sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptivelyprior to a payment default. We code a comprehensive new data set and find that preemptive restructurings (i) are frequent (38% of all deals 1978-2010), (ii) have lower haircuts, (iii) are quicker to negotiate, and (iv) see lower output losses. To rationalize these stylized facts, we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post-default renegotiations. The model improves the fit with the data and explains the sovereign's optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex ante, while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks. Empirical evidence supports these predictions.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 1542-4766 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 43497 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Apr. 2018, 08:04 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:18 |