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Harth, Manfred (2016): Untergräbt der Relativismus die Autorität der Moral und die regulative Funktion ihrer Wahrheit? In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 93, No. 2: pp. 291-322

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In this article, various objections will be discussed that have been put forward against ethical relativism, but which haven't been considered seriously enough on the part of relativists and have been overrated on the part of their opponents. The objections will be concentrated into three arguments: the action-theoretic, the epistemological and the truth-theoretic argument. The article will discuss whether they can be rebutted by proponents of the two main types of relativism: indexical relativism and truth-relativism. The conclusion will be as follows: (i) one version of indexical relativism, the analytical version, gets into serious troubles by the action-theoretic argument, while its revisionary version will remain unaffected, (ii) the epistemological argument fails with respect to indexical relativism and stands on shaky ground as regards truth-relativism, (iii) the truth-theoretic argument puts considerable pressure (solely) on truth-relativism.

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