Abstract
The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and noncausal explanations, according to which both causal and noncausal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of noncausal explanations: Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
ISSN: | 0031-8248 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 46984 |
Date Deposited: | 27. Apr 2018, 08:12 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:23 |