Abstract
Because it asserts that there is consciousness-only (vijnapti-matrata), the difficulty in philosophically approaching the Yogacara-Buddhist text Cheng weishi lun centers on the problem of the external world. This paper is based on a review by Lambert Schmithausen that, specifically with regard to the problem of the external world, questions Dan Lusthaus's phenomenological investigation of the CWSL. In it I point out that the fundamental temporality of consciousness brought to light by the Yogacaric revelation of the incessant differentiation of consciousness (vijnana-parinama) calls into question every temporally conditioned, and hence appropriational, understanding of vijnapti-matrata. Therefore, the problem of the external world cannot be approached without taking into account the temporality of consciousness, which, furthermore, compels us to face the riddle of time.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
ISSN: | 2232-5131 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 46987 |
Date Deposited: | 27. Apr 2018, 08:12 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:23 |