Abstract
Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Social Sciences > Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science |
| ISSN: | 0022-3816 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 47233 |
| Date Deposited: | 27. Apr 2018, 08:12 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:24 |
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