Abstract
We show that a set of prima facie plausible assumptions on the relation of meaning resemblance - one of which is a compositionality postulate - is inconsistent. On this basis we argue that either there is no theoretically useful notion of semantic resemblance at all, or the traditional conception of the compositionality of meaning has to be adapted. In the former case, arguments put forward by Nelson Goodman and Paul Churchland in favor of the concept of meaning resemblance are defeated. In the other case, it must be possible to account for degrees of compositionality or for other refinements of compositionality that are compatible with meaning resemblance.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISSN: | 1746-8361 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 49606 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 28. Mai 2018, 12:33 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:27 |